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"Water corporation" includes every corpora-
tion and person, their lessees, trustees, and 
receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or 
managing any water system for public service 
within this state. It does not include pri-
vate irrigation companies engaged in distrib-
uting water only to their stockholders, or 
towns, cities, counties, water conservancy 
districts, improvement districts, or other 
governmental units created or organized under 
any general or special law of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(34) 
Water, sewer, gas, electricity, telephone and 
public transportation — Service beyond city 
limits — Retainage escrow. 
(1) They may construct, maintain and operate 
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment 
systems, gas works, electric light works, 
telephone lines or public transportation sys-
tems, or authorize the construction, mainte-
nance and operation of the same by others, or 
purchase or lease such works or systems from 
any person or corporation, and they may sell 
and deliver the surplus product or service 
capacity of any such works, not required by 
the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond 
the limits of the city. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (1992) 
-vi-
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over final orders issued by 
the Public Service Commission ("Commission*') pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i). Appellant/Petitioner contests 
jurisdiction, however, on the grounds that the order from which 
it appeals, which the Commission has declared is a final order, 
is not final. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. DOES THE COMMISSION HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION 
OVER SANDY'S SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENTS? 
II. DID THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DEPRIVE SANDY CITY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS BY DENYING 
SANDY CITY THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVI-
DENCE RELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION MADE BY 
THE COMMISSION? 
III. IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER A FINAL ORDER DIS-
POSING OF ALL THE ISSUES BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION? 
This issue includes the following sub-issues. 
a. IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS IN PURPORTING TO MAKE FINDINGS OF 
FACT WHEN NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO IT? 
b. IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT WOULD BE PRESENTED TO 
IT IN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING? 
C. DID THE COMMISSION ERR IN BIFURCATING THE 
ISSUE OF APPROVAL OF THE CONTRACT FROM ITS 
DECLARATION OF JURISDICTION? 
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STANDARD OP APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Public Service Commission issued an Order which is 
attached hereto as Addendum 1 declaring it had jurisdiction to 
regulate the rates charged by Sandy City for the sale of water to 
non-residents. The Order was issued without any evidentiary 
hearing and is based on the Commission's interpretation of con-
stitutional and statutory law. The appropriate standard of 
review for questions of law is de novo review without deference 
to the Commission's decision. MCI v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 186 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1992); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Morton Intern. Inc. v. Auditing 
Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioners White City Water Company and Sandy City 
appeal from an Order issued by the Commission declaring that the 
Commission has jurisdiction over a municipality to regulate the 
rates charged by the municipality for providing water to resi-
dents living outside its boundaries. In issuing this Order, the 
Commission severed the jurisdictional issue addressed by the 
Order from the original petition filed by White City Water Com-
pany ("White City") for approval by the Commission of a Contract 
of Sale of the stock of White City to the Municipal Building 
Authority of Sandy City (the "Building Authority"). 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
White City, a water utility, applied for approval by 
the Commission of an agreement by which all of its stock would be 
sold to the Building Authority. The application requested deter-
mination by the Coinmission that upon consummation of the proposed 
transaction, subsequent ownership by the Building Authority and 
operation of the water system by Sandy City would no longer be 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. 
White City Water Users, Salt Lake County and Sandy City 
filed petitions to intervene in this matter. The Commission 
allowed the intervention of these parties and directed the par-
ties to submit legal memoranda concerning the Commission's juris-
diction subsequent to the sale if the sale were approved. With-
out allowing the parties to present evidence and without conduct-
ing any formal proceedings, and over the objections of Sandy City 
and White City, the Commission issued the Order purporting to 
find that it would have jurisdiction over Sandy's sale of water 
to non-Sandy residents. More specifically, the Commission's 
Order first purported to sever the issue of approval of the sale 
from what it characterized as the jurisdictional issue and then 
ruled that it would have jurisdiction if the sale were found to 
be in the public interest. Sandy City and White City seek review 
of that Order. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 4, 1991, White City filed an applica-
tion advising the Commission that it had entered into an agree-
ment with Scindy City and the Building Authority to sell all of 
its stock to the Building Authority. Sandy City would then 
lease and operate the water system. The application which is 
attached hereto as Addendum 2, informed the Commission that the 
geographic area served by White City was contiguous to and partly 
within Sandy City and within an unincorporated area of Salt Lake 
County. The application stated that Sandy City's water system 
had facilities that were fully sufficient to provide storage and 
pressure to Sandy City's existing customers as well as to the 
customers of White City. R. 0081. 
2. The application noted that White City had water 
rights that were ordinarily sufficient to give adequate and con-
tinuous water service to its customers. White City, however, 
lacks adequate facilities to store water at sufficient elevation 
to provide pressure to serve its customers. Additionally, White 
City lacks sufficient storage and delivery capacity to meet pro-
longed emergency in the case of an emergency draw down. Cur-
rently, although these deficiencies are being mitigated by pur-
chasing water from the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Dis-
trict, there is no guarantee that needed emergency capacity will 
be available. White City has been unable to construct additional 
storage and distribution facilities to provide adequate pressure 
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for anticipated emergency situations. The application notes that 
even if White City does obtain permission to build such facili-
ties, it will need to expend money beyond its present resources. 
Consequently, White City would have to borrow funds for such a 
construction which would result in substantially higher rates for 
its customers. R. 0081-83. 
3. The application stated that the water systems of 
White City and Sandy City are well matched for efficiencies to 
result from the proposed integration. The application noted that 
approval of the agreement is in the public interest in that it 
would result in better service to all customers of White City and 
Sandy City in the foreseeable future. R. 0084. 
4. On November 7, 1991, Sandy City sought permission 
to intervene and in late November, 1991, White City water users 
petitioned to intervene. On December 9, 1991, the Commission 
held a prehearing and granted the proposed intervention of Sandy 
City and White City water users. R. 0003. At the December 9th 
prehearing, the Commission also scheduled briefing on the issue 
of the scope of the Commissions jurisdiction in approving or 
disapproving White City water. A hearing was scheduled for Feb-
ruary 18, 1992. R. 0171. 
5. Subsequently, on January 10, 1992, the Commission 
issued a pre-hearing order. The Commission set out the dates for 
the scheduled briefing and discovery, stating that "although this 
docket is obstensibly about the sale of the outstanding shares of 
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Applicant to Sandy City, an issue of broader concern surfaced 
having to do with the authority of Commission once the sale is 
consummated to regulate the rates cheirged and service provided to 
certain Applicants customers who reside outside the municipal 
boundaries of Sandy City." R. 0164-165. 
6. The January 10, 1992 Order did not suggest the 
Commission's intent to separate the issue of jurisdiction from 
the issue of approval of the agreement. R. 0164-166. 
7. Prior to the hearing set for February 18, 1992, 
and without giving the parties an opportunity to present evi-
dence, the Commission determined that it would describe the case 
as having two issues; (1) whether the sale was in the public 
interest, and (2) whether the Commission would have jurisdiction 
if the sale were approved. Additionally, the Commission unilat-
erally determined that it would issue an Order declaring it would 
retain jurisdiction over the sale of water to former White City 
customers who were not Sandy residents. At the hearing before 
the Commission on February 18, 1992, Chairman Stewart stated: 
If I may first give a little history of why 
we are here today. Following the hearing in 
this matter, or prehearing in this matter 
s€iveral months ago, the Commission in that 
hearing ordered that briefs would be filed on 
the question of the legal authority of the 
Commission. 
Following submission of those briefs, the 
Commission reached a preliminary conclusion 
that it would exercise jurisdiction over rate 
payers affected by this purchase if the pur-
chase was to go forth. 
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A week ago Friday, on February 7th, at the 
request of the attorneys in this case, an 
informal meeting was held in the Chairman's 
office in which the original question of what 
should be intended for today7s hearing, [sic] 
At that time, we communicated to the attor-
neys that we had made that preliminary deci-
sion and indicated to them that they then had 
the option of appearing here today for oral 
argument, recognizing the Commission initial 
decision. 
They could appear today to have a prehearing 
to schedule this matter further and several 
other options were discussed. We did not 
hear anything from the attorneys and about 
the middle of last week, the Commission 
approved an order prepared by our Administra-
tive Judge Thurman which order states that we 
intend to exercise the jurisdiction that we 
had indicated to the attorneys in the previ-
ous meeting would be the case. . . . 
So the purpose of today's hearing is simply 
to hear oral argument on the legal issues 
that were presented in the briefs and follow-
ing this hearing, the Commission will deter-
mine whether or not we have been swayed to 
alter the preliminary order which was signed 
last week. If not, it will then be up to the 
parties to determine where we go from here. 
R. 0023-25. 
8. At the February 18, 1992 hearing, White City 
objected to the Commission's issuing of an order prior to a con-
sideration of the facts at issue, by stating: 
[E]ven in the case of a declaratory judgment, 
there must be a case in controversy and the 
opinion laid against the background of the 
factual situation in the case. 
You haven't done that here yet. You have 
seen some pleading and that's all. It is our 
feeling that if you do this in a vacuum, not 
against the back drop of any particular set 
of facts, you will be departing from the 
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entire tradition, the common law so far as 
decision making is concerned. 
R. 0027. 
9. Additionally, White City pointed out to the Com-
mission that there was currently before the Legislature a bill 
that would grant jurisdiction to the Commission where a city 
served non-residents, belying the Commission's conclusion that 
the government statutory framework gave the Commission jurisdic-
tion. R. 0028. 
10. White City also told the Commission that although 
White City water users currently had one of the lowest rates for 
water in the entire state, partially due to the age of the sys-
tem, White City Water Company was constructed at a time when 
costs were lower. Consequently, much of the White City system is 
fully depreciated on the books and although the rate base is just 
over $1 million, the system could not be reproduced today for 
less than $15 million. White City noted that within the next 
five years, White City would have to invest over $3.5 million to 
replace old pipes and to solve storage and pressure problems. 
The costs of these improvements would result in an increase in 
rates to a level above any rate which Sandy would charge 
non-residents. R. 003 0. 
11. White City represented to the Commission that 
although it could handle one or two home fires, it could not han-
dle more complex fire emergencies, such as a shopping center, 
with its current facilities. White City urged the Commission to 
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approve the contract for safety reasons and to allow for contin-
ued good water service to the Community. R. 0031. 
12. White City also noted that it would be in the pub-
lic interest for White City to consolidate with another system 
and that Sandy City's system was the most appropriate for consol-
idation. R. 0032. 
13. Sandy City argued that the Commission could not 
determine whether it had jurisdiction unless the Commission first 
heard the factual background concerning the the sale of White 
City stock to Sandy City. Specifically, Sandy City argued that 
the evidentiary hearings on the public interest question would 
address the same evidence necessary to determine if the Commis-
sion could constitutionally assert jurisdiction. Sandy City, 
therefore, urged the Commission not to issue an order on juris-
diction without facts to support its legal conclusions, stating: 
[I]f you issue [the order] without a factual 
framework against which to judge the extent 
of jurisdiction, [it will] place all cities 
at risk with respect to the extent to which 
they are submitting themselves to jurisdic-
tion of the Commission. That is simply some-
thing that needs to be explained against the 
factual framework. 
R. 0037, 0039. Sandy City noted that if the Commission was going 
to consider jurisdiction, "it need[ed] to do so with a full fac-
tual hearing in order to decide whether the ground to be broken 
[was] appropriate." R. 0040. Sandy City reiterated that the 
question of jurisdiction "should be addressed in a full factual 
hearing." R. 0041. 
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14. The Commission refused to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of jurisdiction. Instead, the Commission 
assigned a separate docket number to the jurisdiction issue and 
severed that issue from White City's application for approval of 
its agreement with Sandy City. R. 0355. 
15. Although the Commission purported to sever the 
jurisdictional question from the original application, the Com-
mission has not established a separate file for the two proceed-
ings or otherwise dealt with the "severed" cases as separate mat-
ters. See Record as a whole. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
White City sought approval from the Commission for the 
sale of all its stock to the Building Authority and for a deter-
mination by the commission that if the sale was completed, the 
Commission would no longer have jurisdiction over the water sys-
tem. Before any evidence was presented, and over the objections 
of the parties, the Commission issued an order which: (1) severed 
the issue of jurisdiction from the issue of approval of the sale; 
(2) gave the jurisdiction issue a new docket number; and 
(3) declared that the Commission would have subsequent jurisdic-
tion. For the reasons set forth below, the Commission's Order 
should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the Commis-
sion for an evidentiary hearing. 
First, under existing constitutional law, statutory law 
and controlling case law, the Commission does not have 
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jurisdiction over cities which sell water to non-residents. To 
the contrary, cities have statutory authority to sell surplus 
water to non-residents. In fact, Utah's Constitution prohibits 
state agencies such as the Commission from regulating cities 
performing a municipal function. Under controlling case law, 
service of water to non-residents constitutes a municipal func-
tion. Furthermore, even if the analysis set forth in West Jordan 
v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 1988) applies to 
the sale of water, the Commission utterly failed to perform the 
factual analysis set out in West Jordan. Instead, the Commission 
relied on its beliefs, surmise, suspicions and unsupported con-
clusions, without any basis in fact to make its decision. 
Second, the Commission's order denies the parties their 
constitutional right to due process. The order, which was writ-
ten before any evidence was presented, is not based on factual 
findings. The Commission decided this issue in a factual vacuum 
without reference to the actual facts concerning the application. 
Furthermore, the Commission's order which severed the issues 
without adequate notice to the parties, and which was issued 
without any evidence, denies White City and Sandy City of their 
constitutional due process rights to notice and a fair hearing. 
Third, the Commission's order, which does not address 
the question of whether it will approve the sale, is not a final 
appealable order. The Commission currently has before it White 
City's application for approval of the sale of its stock. 
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Presumably, the Commission will go forward and schedule hearings 
on whether the sale is in the public interest. Many of the facts 
at these hearings will be relevant to the jurisdiction issue. 
Indeed, absent approval of the application, jurisdiction is not 
an issue. Under the terms of the agreement, the sale is condi-
tional on the jurisdictional issue. Clearly, these issues arise 
out of the same operational facts. Under the standards set out 
by this Court relating to finality, this appeal should be dis-
missed because the order in question, though specifically recit-
ing that it was final, did not resolve the present application. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE JURISDIC-
TION OVER MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEMS THAT SERVE NON-CITY 
RESIDENTS. 
White City appropriately sought approval of its agree-
ment to sell all its stock to the Building Authority and 
requested determination by the Commission that upon consummation 
of the proposed transaction, subsequent ownership by the Building 
Authority and operation of the water system by Sandy City would 
not be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. 
The Commission's Order, after purporting to sever the 
issue of approval of the transfer of stock of White City to the 
Building Authority, determined that the Commission would have 
jurisdiction over whatever entity served White City customers 
residing outside the boundaries of Sandy City. More specifi-
cally, the Commission's Order states that if White City's 
-12-
application for approval of its proposed agreement with Sandy 
City is approved, the Commission would have jurisdiction to regu-
late rates charged by Sandy City to non-city customers. 
As demonstrated by this Brief, it is difficult to sepa-
rate the substantive argument over whether the Commission can 
assert jurisdiction over municipalities which serve non-residents 
from the due process and finality arguments made later in this 
Brief. This difficulty stems from the fact that the Commission 
purports to make findings of fact without ever having taken any 
evidence in this matter. In fact, a review of the enumerated 
findings of fact indicates that they bear no relation to the 
ultimate conclusions made by the Commission. Indeed, the Commis-
sion's own language demonstrates that these conclusions are sup-
ported only by the Commission's speculation with respect to the 
parties' merit and not by the stated findings of fact. 
Under the current law, the Commission either clearly 
does not have statutory or constitutional ability to exercise 
jurisdiction over a municipality or, if it does, it may do so 
only under the detailed "weighing" of stated criteria as enunci-
ated in the West Jordan and UAMPS cases. In fact, the various 
factors enunciated in the West Jordan case would be implicit to a 
determination of whether the sale is in the public interest, a 
matter which the Commission has kept before it. Consequently, 
either the Commission clearly exceeded its statutory and consti-
tutional authority or the Commission committed procedural error 
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by attempting to separate the jurisdiction from the public inter-
est determination when both involve the same set of evidentiary 
facts. 
A. STATUTORY LAW AND CONTROLLING CASE LAW PROHIBIT 
THE COMMISSION FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER 
SANDY CITY'S SALE OF SURPLUS WATER TO NON-RESIDENT 
CUSTOMERS. 
The Commission is a creature of the legislature and has 
only those powers specifically delegated to it by statute. As 
stated in Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 
1988), any doubt about the existence of power by the Commission 
must be resolved against the Commission. Id. at 50. As stated 
by this Court: 
Where a "'specific power is conferred by 
statute upon a tribunal, board or commission 
with limited powers, the powers are limited 
to such as are specifically mentioned.'" 
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
103 Utah 186, 197, 134 P.2d 469, 474 (1943) 
(quoting Bamberger Elec. R.R. Co. v. Public 
Util. Comm'n, 59 Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 
320 (1922)). All powers retained by the PSC 
are derived from and created by statute. The 
PSC has no inherent regulatory powers and can 
only assert those which are expressly granted 
or clearly implied as necessary to the dis-
charge of the duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon it. Basin Flying Serv. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n. 531 P. 2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 
1975). To ensure that the administrative 
powers of the PSC are not overextended, "any 
reasonable doubt of the existence of any 
power must be resolved against the exercise 
thereof." Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal Com-
plaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 
1982) . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
-14-
In th i s instance, the Commission's jurisdict ion i s 
limited to regulation of "public u t i l i t i e s . " By definit ion a 
public u t i l i t y includes a "water corporation" . . . "where the 
service i s performed for, or the commodity delivered to , the 
public generally." § 54-2-1(19)(a). A c i ty , by statutory 
def init ion, i s not a water corporation and, therefore, not a 
public u t i l i t y . 1 See Utah Code Ann. §54-2-1(34) ("'water 
corporation7 includes every corporation and person . . . and i t 
does not include . . . towns, c i t i e s , . . . or other governmental 
units created or organized under any general or special law of 
th i s state.") Thompson v. Salt Lake Corp. , 724 P.2d 958, 595 
(Utah 1986) ("a municipal corporation . . . i s authorized to 
operate water works. However, i t does not engage in the act iv i ty 
as a public u t i l i t y , but i s spec i f ica l ly excluded from that 
1
 The Bui ld ing Author i ty i s not sub jec t to the Commission's 
j u r i s d i c t i o n e i t h e r . The terms "water co rpo ra t ion" and "co rpo ra t ion" as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 exclude not only c i t i e s and towns but any 
"governmental u n i t c r ea t ed under [a] genera l or s p e c i a l law of t h i s s t a t e . " 
As a c r e a t u r e of the Utah Municipal Bui lding Author i ty Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17A-3-901 e t s e q . , the Bui ld ing Author i ty f a l l s ou t s i de d e f i n i t i o n of a 
water c o r p o r a t i o n . Furthermore, the Act s p e c i f i c a l l y exempts the Bui lding 
Author i ty and the p r o j e c t s i t acqu i res (such as the White Ci ty water system), 
from Commission j u r i s d i c t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914(3) 
p rov ides : 
(3) No board, commission, or agency of the 
s t a t e , inc lud ing the Utah Publ ic Service Commission, 
s h a l l have any j u r i s d i c t i o n over b u i l d i n g a u t h o r i t i e s 
or p r o j e c t s . 
In sum, both by the l i m i t e d na tu re of i t s own a u t h o r i t y and by express 
l e g i s l a t i v e exc lus ion , the Commission has no a u t h o r i t y over the Bui lding 
Author i ty . 
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status,") Clearly, the Commissions statutory authority does not 
extend to regulation of water service provided by a municipality. 
Sandy City is not a "water company" and, therefore, is not a 
"public utility" or a "corporation" subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the Commission concedes it has no statutory 
authority to assert jurisdiction over Sandy City in the order 
itself. The order states: 
While there may be no explicit statutory 
authority for us to assume jurisdiction, the 
obvious remedy for the abuse of extra terri-
torial customers is for us to continue to 
regulate their rates; otherwise, to meet the 
Court's concern, the instant proposal would 
have to be found ultra vires. 
Order at p. 14. 
The Commission ignores its own concession that it has 
no statutory authority and tries to bootstrap itself into author-
ity by claiming that Sandy City's authority is also limited. 
Sandy City's authority, however, has no relevance to the issue of 
the Commission's authority. Even if Sandy City were to engage in 
ultra vires activity, the result would not be an expansion of the 
Commission's jurisdiction. Rather, Sandy city would be subject 
to appropricite court order enjoining such activity. In sum, the 
district courts, not the Commission, possess general jurisdiction 
to resolve disputes under Utah law. 
The Commission cannot expand its jurisdiction to fill 
what it perceives to be a gap in its statutory authorization. 
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Indeed, the absence of continuing jurisdiction could presumably 
be one of the issues the Commission considers in determining 
whether the sale is in the public interest, along with other 
evidence concerning whether the sale is in the public interest• 
It is inappropriate and unnecessary, however, for the Commission 
to assert jurisdiction where the statutes provide none, in order 
to prevent this sale from proceeding. Instead, the Commission 
should fully evaluate the applications long term impact on the 
public interest and rule accordingly. 
The Commission's order relies on North Salt Lake v. St. 
Joseph Water & Irr. Co.. 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577 (Utah 1950) 
to extend its jurisdiction over rate regulation of Sandy's 
service to non-residents. In this regard, however, the Commis-
sion misreads the facts and the holding of North Salt Lake. In 
North Salt Lake, the newly-formed town of North Salt Lake had 
condemned what was previously a privately-owned water system. 
Owners of certain residential lots outside the town who had 
intended to hook onto the water system when it was private sought 
a determination that the newly-formed town was obligated to 
provide water to them. The court rejected those claims stating, 
that there was no binding obligation upon the owner of the water 
system that encumbered the system itself. The court based its 
ruling, in part, on a determination made by the Commission prior 
to the condemnation that the water company was neither obligated 
nor permitted to provide water service to additional customers. 
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This determination, which was made when the Commission did have 
jurisdiction, was based on the fact that the lack of available 
water might prevent the water company from serving its existing 
customers. The Commission, however, did not rule that the town 
was prohibited from serving additional customers, merely that the 
additional customers could not claim a binding obligation that 
encumbered the water system. Contrary to the Commissions 
reading of the case, the court did not suggest that the Public 
Service Commission or its orders had, or would have, an ongoing 
jurisdiction on the operation of the water system by the Commis-
sion. 
Similarly, the Commission cites Oranqebercr v. Moss, 262 
S.C. 299, 204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974) for the proposition that the 
Commission has jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating 
outside its boundaries. Like its reliance on North Salt Lake, 
the Commission7s reliance on Orangeberg is misplaced. As the 
Commission cidmits, South Carolina has legislation specifically 
empowering their public service commission to regulate 
extra-territorial service. In contrast, Utah has legislation 
that excludes such regulation and, therefore, the holding in 
Orangeburg simply does not apply. 
B. THE COMMISSION IS PROHIBITED BY UTAH'S CONSTITU-
TION FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER SANDY 
CITY'S MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS. 
The Commission is constitutionally prohibited from 
interfering with Sandy City's activities as a municipality. 
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Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution provides, in per-
tinent part, that "the Legislature will not delegate to any spe-
cial commission . . . any power to make, supervise or interfere 
with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, 
whether held in trust or otherwise . . . or to perform any munic-
ipal functions." Utah Const. Article VI, § 28. 
The provision of water services to residents and 
non-residents constitutes a municipal function. Additionally, 
cities are statutorily authorized to provide surplus water out-
side of their boundaries. Indeed, the legislature has stated 
that cites "may construct, maintain and operate water works 
. . . or lease such works . . . from any person or corporation, 
and they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service 
capacity of any such works, not required by the city or its 
inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-14 (1992). 
The provision from the Utah Code quoted above was 
interpreted in County Water System v. Salt Lake City. 3 Utah 2d 
46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954) where the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
held that Salt Lake City had authority to sell its surplus water 
beyond the city limits, that such sales were a municipal func-
tion, and that such sales were not subject to Commission juris-
diction. On the basis of Section 10-8-14, the Court held: 
Such sale of surplus water, being autho-
rized by law [Section 10-8-14] as a municipal 
function, is as much a municipal function as 
the supplying of water within the city lim-
its, and disposing of the surplus outside its 
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limits as permitted by statute does not 
change its character as a municipality; nor 
does the ownership and management of the nec-
essary facilities beyond the city boundaries 
change such property to anything other than 
municipal property. 
County Water Systems, 278 P.2d at 290, Thusf the Court held that 
Salt Lake City was not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction 
in selling surplus water outside its corporate boundaries and 
that the constitutional provision which is now Article VI, 
Section 28, precluded any grant of authority to the Commission 
over Salt Lake City's operation of its water system. See also 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 121-22 (Utah 
1977), (Salt Lake City's "business in furnishing water to its 
residents and activities reasonably incidental thereto is not 
subject to regulation by the Public Service Commission"). 
Sandy City asserts, and because no facts have been 
raised to refute it, it must be assumed, that acquisition and 
operation of the White City system is incidental to its overall 
provision of general water service deslivery to its own residents. 
Because White City is located in the middle of Sandy City's 
service area, integration of the two systems will enhance Sandy 
City's ability to serve its own customers by eliminating a "hole" 
in its delivery network. Integration of the two systems also 
will minimize the duplication of pipes and other facilities in 
some areas, resulting in more reliable service to all of White 
City's customers both inside and outside of Sandy City's limits. 
Almost half of White City's customers reside within Sandy City 
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and White City's non-resident customers are located in an 
unincorporated island which is within Sandy City's existing 
service area. It is economically and operationally rational for 
Sandy City to provide water service to those customers after its 
acquisition of the system and incident to its overall resident 
customer water delivery. Furthermore, Sandy City has ample 
capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City customers and will, 
therefore, be selling "surplus" water to them upon acquisition of 
the White City system. 
C. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DOES NOT APPLY THE APPRO-
PRIATE STANDARD TO DETERMINE IF SANDY CITY'S SALE 
OP WATER TO NON-RESIDENT USERS IS A MUNICIPAL 
FUNCTION. 
The Commission attempts to rewrite Utah law by relying 
on Utah Assoc. Mun. Power Sys. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 789 P.2d 
298 (Utah 1990) ("UAMPS") and West Jordan v. Utah State Retire-
ment Bd. , 767 P. 2d 530 (Utah 1988) for its assertion that "ser-
vice to the extra-territorial customers is not a municipal func-
tion." Order at 9. The Commissions reliance is misplaced 
because the instant transaction does not fit within the UAMPS 
analysis and the Commission did not properly apply the analysis. 
The Commission cites West Jordan to assert that "no 
particular activity conducted by a municipality is ipso facto a 
municipal function for purposes of Article VI, Section 28." 
Order at 10. The West Jordan case does not hold that there are 
no activities which are necessarily municipal functions. Rather, 
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the case holds that where the character of a particular activity 
under Utah law is not clear, the court will determine whether the 
activity constitutes a municipal function by considering a number 
of factors. The Utah Supreme Court has, however, already deter-
mined that the sale of surplus water to non-residents is a proper 
municipal function. In County Water Sys., 278 P.2d at 285, the 
court held that the "sale of surplus water, being authorized by 
law as a municipal function, is as much a municipal function as 
the supplying of water within the city limits." Jd. at 290. 
This ruling has never been questioned, much less overturned, by 
the Utah Supreme Court; it is and remains controlling law in the 
State of Utah and the Commission may not ignore its clear 
holding. 
Even, if the Commission is correct in its assumption 
that the West Jordan case invalidates the County Water System 
case as controlling law, the Commission would be required to make 
detailed factual findings based upon evidence on a number of 
issues, including: 
the relative abilities of the state and 
municipal governments to perform the func-
tion, the degree to which the performance of 
the function affects the interest of those 
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, 
and the extent to which the legislation under 
attack would intrude upon the ability of the 
people within the municipality to control 
through their elected officials are subject 
to policy that affect them uniquely. 
West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 534. 
-22-
The Commission has not made such specific findings nor 
could it have made such findings because it refused to proceed 
with an evidentiary basis. In fact, the Commission's Findings of 
Fact are very limited and do not address any of the conclusions 
at which the Commission later arrived. Rather, the Findings of 
Fact are innocuous and incomplete recitations of either the 
Application or briefs. 
The Commission's complete Findings of Fact are as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Applicant is a water corporation certificated by this 
Commission. In its Application, Applicant seeks 
approval of a transfer of all its outstanding stock to 
an instrumentality of Sandy City Corporation (hereafter 
"Sandy"), a Utah municipal corporation. Applicant fur-
ther seeks declaratory relief in the form of a Commis-
sion declaration that "the integrated system consti-
tutes a municipal water system under the laws of the 
State of Utah." 
2. Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would be 
transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of 
Sandy City (hereafter "the Authority"). Applicant 
would retain its corporate existence for the lifetime 
of the bonds issued by the Authority to finance the 
purchase. 
3. Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a 
nominal rental, would lease the system to the Author-
ity, which in turn would sublease to Sandy. Sandy 
would actually operate the system and, to the extent 
feasible, would integrate Applicant's present system 
with Sandy's municipal system. Payment to the bond-
holders would be made by the Authority out of rentals 
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn pro-
poses to pay the rental fees out of water charges to 
customers. 
4. In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers 
residing outside the city limits will be charged more 
than those residing within. The stated rationale is 
-23-
that the customers outside the city limits should bear 
a greater proportion of the costs of the acquisition. 
5. In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically 
conditioned upon this Commission's final Order declar-
ing that the Commission does not have and will not 
assert any jurisdiction over Sandy, whether in regard 
to customers residing inside or outside the city 
limits. 
From these limited findings, and without the benefit of 
evidence, the Commission's Conclusions of Law "predict with con-
siderable confidence, that in case of conflict between the inter-
ests of franchised and disenfranchised customers, the interests 
of the former will receive priority — no matter how vociferous 
the protest raised in meetings." Order at 5. 
This "prediction" is without support in the findings 
and is without any evidence with respect to the process by which 
Sandy City sets its rates. Despite this lack of supporting evi-
dence, however, the Commission's Conclusions of Law continue by 
stating: 
Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its 
own bonds. We strongly suspect the Authority 
is involved in the transaction only in a 
"belt and suspenders" attempt to insulate the 
real principals, applicant and Sandy, from 
our jurisdiction. We beli€»ve we are entitled 
to assess the substance, not the mere form, 
of a transaction. So assessing the transac-
tion, it is obvious the Authority has no real 
role or participation in the management, and 
its presence should be disregarded. 
Order at 7-8 (emphasis added). Based on suspicion, certainly not 
the Findings of Fact nor any evidence, the Commission chooses to 
disregard the structure of the transaction and the good faith of 
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the parties, stating that "in this case . . . Sandy will not be 
disposing of surplus water it now possesses — it will be surplus 
only by virtue of Sandy's calculated acquisition of a class of 
captive, disenfranchised customers — precisely the situation 
Justice Crocket inveighed against." Order at 12-13. 
Once again, the Findings of Fact contains no support 
for this critical conclusion by the Commission. Lacking evidence 
to make such a finding, the Commission simply makes an expedient 
conclusion of law, ignoring the inherently factual nature of a 
determination of "surplus." This is a particularly important 
jump for the Commission to make in its analysis because its later 
conclusion that the transaction is not an appropriate exercise of 
municipal power depends on its conclusion that the sale is not of 
surplus water. The Commission, through constructing this "neat" 
syllogism, sought to avoid the full analysis of whether the 
transaction was a constitutionally protected municipal function 
under the West Jordan and UAMPS cases. 
The Commission misapplies the ruling set out in UAMPS. 
Both West Jordan and UAMPS determined that a statute granting 
jurisdiction to a Commission is constitutional. In contrast, in 
this case the Commission is excluded by statute from regulating 
Sandy City's water system. In UAMPS a coalition of cities asked 
the Commission for a certificate of convenience to construct 
electric transmission lines in southern Utah. The cities acted 
under the auspices of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Utah Code 
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Ann. § 11-13-1 to -36 (1986) which requires such coalitions to 
obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Com-
mission before constructing a transmission line. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-13-27 (1986). The Commission, after extensive evidence 
was presented in over fifty hearings, denied the petition. The 
coalition sought to overturn the statute as unconstitutional on 
the grounds it contravenes Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution.. 
Although the Court in UAMPS rejected "pat characteriza-
tions" of specific functions or categories of functions as being 
invariably "municipal," it did not question or reject the 
long-standing holding of County Water Svs. Rather, the Court 
analyzed whether under the factual scenario of UAMPS, the build-
ing of electric transmission lines over broad stretches of land 
was a "municipal function" excluding Commission jurisdiction 
where the state legislature had so provided. Unlike the coali-
tion of cities in UAMPS which was required by statute to seek 
approval from the Commission for trcinsmission lines, the Commis-
sion is specifically excluded by statute from exercising juris-
diction over the sale of surplus water by municipalities. 
Furthermore, even if the analytical framework set out 
in UAMPS applies, the Commission failed to apply the balancing 
approach to the facts in this case. The Commissions analysis is 
limited to the bold assertion, without any basis in fact, that 
"the only 'substantial interest7 our assuming jurisdiction would 
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affect would be that of Sandy in 'milking' the extra-territorial 
customers to the maximum extent possible." Order at 10, note 3. 
The Commission does not refer to or put into the balance the fol-
lowing facts: (1) Unlike the proposed transmission line in UAMPS 
which had "far-reaching impacts beyond the boundaries of UAMPS 
members," forty-two percent of White City customers are Sandy 
City residents and the remaining White City customers are sur-
rounded by Sandy City and form a "hole" in Sandy City's water 
supply grid; and (2) Unlike the situation in UAMPS where the coa-
lition proposed to duplicate existing and proposed lines, White 
City needs extensive and costly updating to keep White City cus-
tomers adequately provided with water for emergency situations 
such as fires. The Commission does not refer to the economies of 
scale or increased public safety that will be effected by the 
sale of White City Water to Sandy City and the integration of the 
White City system into Sandy City's more reliable water system. 
The* Commission utterly failed to apply any of the elements of the 
balancing test to White City's petition and, indeed, could not 
because it failed to undertake any factual investigation into the 
matter. 
D. THE COMMISSION HAS ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT SALE 
OP WHITE CITY WATER TO NON-SANDY RESIDENTS WOULD 
NOT BE "SURPLUS" WATER. 
As noted above, the Commission states, without any 
findings of fact, that "in this case . . . Sandy will not be dis-
posing of surplus water it now possesses — it will be surplus 
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only by virtue of Sandy's acquisition of a class of captive, dis-
enfranchised customers." Order at 13. The Commission gives no 
criteria for how it determined that the White City water would 
not be surplus water other than to cite to Judge Crockett's admo-
nition that cities are not to engage in the sale of water outside 
its limits as a general business. County Water Svs., 278 P.2d 
at 290. The Commission fails to note Judge Crockett's recogni-
tion that such sale of surplus water is allowed by law and that 
the Commission does not have jurisdiction to regulate it. In 
this regard, Judge Crockett stated: 
Nevertheless, whatever the considerations as 
to the wisdom of the city's being subject to 
regulation by the Public Service Commission 
may be, it is, perhaps fortunately, not our 
responsibility to here evaluate these factors 
and determine what is more desirable as a 
matter of policy. It is rather our duty to 
interpret what was intended by the framers of 
the constitution and the legislative enact-
ments thereunder. 
Id. at 290. 
Similarly, the Commission's citation of C.P. Natl. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 638 P. 2d 519 (Utah 1981) reverses 
the meaning of the case. In C.P. National the court distin-
guished law that applied to the Commission's jurisdiction over 
cities providing extra-territorial water systems and those pro-
viding extra-territorial electricity. The Utah legislature has 
specifically granted cities more power over water systems than 
over electric power systems because water is a scarce and finite 
resource that must be conserved. In fact, the C.P. National 
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Court recognized this distinction by stating that "[tjhe reason 
for the legislature giving broad powers to municipalities in the 
case of waterworks systems may have been because water is a 
scarce and finite resource which is not capable of man-made gen-
eration or replacement as electricity may be." Id. at 523. 
Because C.P. National dealt with the issue of the Commission's 
jurisdiction over an electrical power system, the court distin-
guished its prior ruling in County Water System. Consequently, 
the holding in C.P. National strengthens Sandy City's position 
that the sale of water to non-residents is not subject to the 
Commission's regulations under the current laws of the State of 
Utah. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING CONSTITUTES A DENIAL 
OF THE PARTIES/ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS. 
This Court has stated that "[e]very person who brings a 
claim in a court or at a hearing held before an administrative 
agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front 
of a fair tribunal." Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 
1331, 1333 (Utah 1987)); see also Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). In R.W. 
Jones Trucking, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 649 P. 2d 628 (Utah 
1982) , this Court made it clear that the rule announced in 
Bunnell and reiterated in Tolman applies to hearings before the 
Public Service Commission by stating that "a party before the 
Commission is entitled to 'the essential elements of due process 
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of law • . • notice, an opportunity to be heard and defend in an 
orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case, before a 
tribunal having jurisdiction of the case.'" Id. at 629 (quoting 
Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 99 Utah 28, 96 
P. 2d 722 (1939)); see also Armored Motor Serv. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n. 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P. 2d 582, 584 (Utah 1970) (holding 
that a party appearing before the Commission "is entitled to . . 
. a full and fair opportunity to present his [or her] evidence 
and contentions on the issues; and to have an adequate consider-
ation and a correct determination of them."). 
Although administrative hearings need not possess the 
formality of judicial proceedings, "there remains the 'necessity 
of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural fairness in 
administrative hearings.'" Id. (quoting Nelson v. Dept. of 
Employment, 801 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Indeed, as 
noted by the Tolman Court "[i]t is a clear abuse of discretion 
for an administrative body to exercise its discretion over the 
manner in which it conducts its proceedings such that it denies 
due process to a party appearing before it." Id. 
When a decision by the Commission is judicial in nature 
as it is here, more formality is required. Id. When resolving 
such matters, the Commission must make findings of fact. Moun-
tain States Legal Found, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 
1051 (Utah 1981). In this regard, this Court recently stated 
that the Commission must make sufficient findings of fact on 
-30-
ultimate and subordinate issues of fact, citing Milne Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Contain, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 
1986) as authority. MCI v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 186 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8, 13 (Utah 1992). In Milne, this Court summarized the 
responsibilities of the Commission and the rationale for imposing 
these responsibilities by stating: 
The Commission cannot discharge its statutory 
responsibilities without making findings of 
fact on all necessary ultimate issues under 
the governing statutory standards. It is 
also essential that the Commission make sub-
sidiary findings in sufficient detail that 
the critical subordinate factual issues are 
highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as 
to demonstrate that there is a logical and 
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. 
The importance of complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact is essential to a 
proper determination by an administrative 
agency. To that end, findings should be suf-
ficiently detailed to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are 
reached. 
Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 720 P. 2d at 1378. The Court then 
explained the importance of adequate findings of fact to an 
appellate court by stating that "[w]ithout such findings, this 
Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing the Commissioner's 
order in accordance with established legal principles and of pro-
tecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative action." Id. With these standards in mind, the 
MCI Court reminded the Commission of its obligation to make suf-
ficient findings of fact by stating that "the fixing of utility 
rates by private negotiation with no findings of fact raises 
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serious questions about the legality and integrity of the proce-
dures the Commission employed." MCI. 186 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. 
The Commission's Order th2it is the subject of this 
action was issued without holding an evidentiary hearing despite 
objections by Sandy City. Indeed, before a hearing on the 
approval of the agreement and the jurisdictional question was 
held, the Commission had already drafted the Order at issue and 
informed the parties that it would retain jurisdiction if the 
agreement between White City and Sandy City were approved. The 
Commission told the parties they could argue before it to see if 
the Commission would change its mind. R. 0025. White City 
objected to deciding the issue of jurisdiction in a vacuum and 
Sandy City argued that, under the terms most favorable to the 
Commission's position, jurisdiction required a balancing test 
based on a factual context. Nonetheless, the Commission was ada-
mant that it would decide the jurisdictional issue, standing 
alone, before it heard any facts about whether the Agreement 
between White City and Sandy City was in the public interest. 
The Commission refused to consider facts about whether the public 
interest would be served and by a simple fiat stated that the two 
issues would be severed and that it would issue an Order declar-
ing that it had jurisdiction. No evidence was received by the 
Commission prior to the entry of its Order. In this regard, the 
Commission deprived the parties of their right to due process by 
refusing to provide the parties with a chance to present evidence 
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relevant to their positions. Indeed, an evidentiary hearing 
would have allowed White City Water Company and Sandy City to 
present facts to the Commission demonstrating that approval of 
the proposed transaction would be in the public interest. In 
addition, an evidentiary hearing would give the Commission and 
this Court the factual basis on which to determine the constitu-
tionality of exercising jurisdiction if that determination is 
governed, as the Commission contends, by the West Jordan case. 
Consequently, the matter must be remanded to the Com-
mission for an evidentiary hearing because "'due process demands 
a new trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain that 
[the court] is left with the abiding impression that a reasonable 
person would find the hearing unfair.'" Tolman, 818 P.2d at 28. 
In light of the fact that the Commission refused to hold any 
hearing whatsoever, and gave no notice of its intent to bifurcate 
the issues, a reasonable person would have no choice but to con-
clude the proceedings before the Commission were unfair. The 
unfairness of the proceeding below is most clearly illustrated by 
comparing the Commission's "plain vanilla" Findings of Fact, 
supra which merely recite portions of the application, with the 
unsupported hyperbole in the Commission's Conclusions of Law. 
Additionally, although the Commission's order purports 
to make findings of fact on issues material to this case, there 
is no evidence in the record to support these findings. In fact, 
the Commission expressly states that its decision is based upon 
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its "doubts that service outside the city boundaries would con-
stitute exercise of a municipal function and [their] skepticism 
that Sandy would indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated 
by the Utah statutes." Order at 4 (emphasis added). As noted by 
the Kansas Supreme Court, "[f]indings not based on evidence, but 
on suspicion and conjecture are arbitrary and baseless." Cities 
Servs. Gas. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n., 440 P. 2d 660, 668 (Kan. 
1968). An order based on arbitrary and baseless findings cannot 
be sustained because, as noted by this Court, "to sustain an 
order, the findings must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate 
that the Commission has properly arrived at the ultimate factual 
findings and has properly applied the governing rules of law to 
those findings." Mountain States Legal Found., 63 6 P.2d at 1052. 
Accordingly, the Commissions order at issue in this case cannot 
be sustained by this Court. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT PINAL. 
A. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT FINAL BECAUSE 
THE REQUIREMENTS OP RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE HAVE NOT BEEN 
SATISFIED. 
In its order severing the proceedings, notwithstanding 
the fact it has never held a hearing concerning whether approving 
White City's application is in the public interest, the Commis-
sion issued what it has called a "final order" on the issue of 
jurisdiction. Before an order can be final for appellate 
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purposes, however, the requirements of Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
2 
Rules of Civil Procedure must be satisfied. This rule states: 
When more than one claim for relief is pre-
sented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of deci-
sion, however designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties 
shall not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and lia-
bilities of all the parties. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
In l i g h t of the express language of Rule 54(b), courts 
have held t ha t an appel la te court lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n when issues 
and/or p a r t i e s remain before the t r i a l cour t . For example, in 
F i r s t Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the 
Utah Court of Appeals held t ha t i t did not have j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
one claim tha t had been t r i e d separately because other r e l a t ed 
claims remained below. 
1
 Rule 750-100-11 of the Utah Admin is t ra t ive Code s t a t e s t h a t " [ a ] p p e a l s 
from f i n a l o rders of the Commission s h a l l be to the Supreme Court of Utah and 
s h a l l be pursued in accordance with the a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s and cour t r u l e s . " 
Utah Admin. R. 750-100-11 (1992). 
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Even if the forum issuing an order certifies the order 
as final for appeal, the analysis does not end. Indeed, this 
Court has stated that a district court or other forum 
"cannot. . . make a non-final order appealable. An order is 
either final or it is not. The terminology used in describing it 
cannot change its fundamental character." Olsen v. Salt Lake 
City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). In this regard, 
this Court has stated that Rule 54(b) certifications are rather 
freely granted, "often without examining closely the 
certifiability of the underlying order." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1991). The Court 
continued by offering the following standard to determine if an 
issue should be certified under Rule 54(b): "When [the] factual 
overlap [of issues] is such that separate claims appear to be 
based on the same operative facts with minor variations, they are 
held not to constitute separate claims for Rule 54(b) purposes." 
Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1103. In other words, "a 'separate claim7 
must arise from different facts than those underlying the remain-
ing causes of action." Webb v. Vantage Income Properties, 818 
P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1991). Similarly, this court has also stated 
that 
"Finality," for purposes of the application 
of Rule 54(b), is generally understood as 
that degree of finality required to meet the 
appealability requirements of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. . . . This, in turn, is usually 
defined as a judgment "which ends the litiga-
tion on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment." 
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Olsen, 724 P.2d at 964-65 (citations omitted). In sum, disposing 
of one significant issue in a case does not make certification 
appropriate. Webb, 818 P.2d at 2. 
In light of the standards of Rule 54(b) discussed 
above, the Commission's characterization of its order as final is 
improper. Indeed, as demonstrated by the language from Kennecott 
quoted above, the Commission could not properly have certified 
this order as final because the operative facts underlying this 
order not only overlap but are identical to those involved in the 
contract issue pending before the Commission. The only way the 
Commission could resolve its "doubts" and "conjecture" would be 
to complete its review of the public interest issues still pend-
ing. Additionally, the Commission's order regarding jurisdiction 
did not end litigation on the merits of White City's action as 
required by Olsen. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal and, therefore, the Commission's order 
regarding the appeal should be dismissed and the matter remanded 
to the Commission for resolution of all the pending issues. 
Manila v. Broadbent Land Co. , 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991) (holding 
that the remedy for improperly accepting an appeal is dismissal 
of the appeal). 
B. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT A FINAL ORDER 
BECAUSE RELEVANT ISSUES STILL REMAIN UNRESOLVED. 
This action began when White City Water Company filed 
an Application with the Commission to approve a contract that 
White City had entered into with Sandy City and the Building 
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Authority. The Commission did not determine whether it would 
approve the contract and that issue is still pending. In fact, 
the Commission is in the process of scheduling hearings to deter-
mine whether the transaction should be approved. Without making 
a determination about the public int€>rest, and without gathering 
any evidence, the Commission issued an order stating that it 
would retain jurisdiction over White City water users residing 
outside of Sandy if the transaction was completed. In support of 
its decision, the Commission stated: 
We deem the jurisdictional question of such 
importance that it should be resolved before 
inquiring whether the transfer is in the pub-
lic interest. Accordingly, we sever the 
prayer for declaratory relief from the bal-
ance of the proceeding and declare the Com-
mission has jurisdiction over a municipality 
to the extent it provides retail water ser-
vice outside its boundaries as a general 
business. 
Commission's Order Severing Proceeding at 1. 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review final 
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
before the Commission. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (i) 
1992) ("The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over . . . final orders 
and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with 
the Public Service Commission."); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16 (1992) ("As provided by statute, the Supreme Court 
. . . has jurisdiction to review all final agency action result-
ing from formal adjudicative proceedings."). As noted by the 
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express language of the statutes quoted above, this Court's 
jurisdiction is limited to the review of final orders of the Com-
mission. Additionally, applicable case law holds that courts do 
not have jurisdiction to review an administrative decision until 
all issues have been resolved and the proceeding before the 
administrative agency is final. See Keystone, a Division of 
Ralston Purina Co. v. Flynn, 769 P.2d 484, 489 (Colo. 1989). The 
following discussion demonstrates that the order at issue in this 
case is not a final order. Consequently, this Court does not 
have jurisdiction to hear this matter. 
Where an applicant raises issues to be decided, an 
order of the Commission is not final until those issues are 
resolved. JEd. Thus, "an order of [an] agency is not final so 
long as it reserves something for the agency for further deci-
sion. " Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that an order remanding the case 
to Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings was not a 
final order for purposes of judicial review). Simply assigning a 
separate docketing number to one phase of a proceeding does not 
make an interlocutory decision final. Public Util. Comm/n v. 
Paudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n, 173 Colo. 364, 366, 480 P.2d 
106, 108 (Colo. 1970). Applying this rule to a case involving 
the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that "[t]he assignment of separate numbers by the Com-
mission to its decisions dealing with different phases of the 
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same proceeding did not create two separate proceedings." Id. 
The court continued by stating that reducing an administrative 
matter to final judgment required "settling all the issues 
between the parties." Id. 
The principles discussed by the Colorado Supreme Court 
in Paudre Valley are directly applicable in this case. Accord-
ingly, the Commission may not create a separate proceeding simply 
by purporting to carve out one issue in a proceeding and assign-
ing it a separate docket number. Additionally, even assuming 
that the Commission could create a separate proceeding, it has 
not done so. Although the Commission stated that the proceeding 
had been bifurcated, no actual separation was, or could have been 
done. Had the proceeding been bifurcated, thereby creating two 
separate and distinct cases, two separate and distinct case files 
would have been created, each containing only the documents rele-
vant to its respective case. Instead, the Commission has main-
tained only one file containing all documents relevant to both 
supposed separate and distinct cases. Indeed, the record on 
review as designated by the Commission is not limited to those 
documents relevant to the issue of jurisdiction. Rather, the 
record sent up to this Court contains all documents in the file 
relating to White City's initial application. In fact, the file 
before the Commission in regards to its continued consideration 
of White City's application is identical to the file considered 
by the Commission before it ruled on the issue of jurisdiction. 
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In sum, the Commission cannot and has not created two separate 
matters in this case. The initial issue of White City's applica-
tion, therefore, remains before the Commission. In fact, the 
Commission implicitly admits that its order regarding jurisdic-
tion does not resolve all the issues before it by stating in the 
order that "[i]n light of our action in this proceeding, Appli-
cant may choose to proceed or not in the approval action." 
Order at 4. Clearly until the issue of approval is resolved, the 
Commissions order regarding jurisdiction is not a final order. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is prematurely before the Utah Supreme Court. 
In fact, this matter is before this Court only because White City 
and Sandy City were required to appeal the Commission's Order 
regarding jurisdiction because the Commission purported to parse 
out a jurisdictional question through the simple expedient of 
assigning a new case number and then characterized that decision 
as final. That approach was unfair to the parties, to the Com-
mission itself and ultimately to this Court. 
The central question pending before the Commission is 
whether the subject transaction is in the public interest. The 
evidence relating to that determination is the same evidence 
which, under the Commission's reading of the UAMPS and West Jor-
dan cases, is necessary for the Commission to constitutionally 
assert jurisdiction. Even that analysis, however, will not 
resolve the absence of statutory authorization for the Commission 
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to assert jurisdiction over the provision of water to 
extra-territorial customers of Sandy City. Furthermore, the 
jurisdictional stretch attempted by the Commission may not be 
necessary because the Commission ultimately may decide that the 
sale is not in the public interest, that the sale will not be in 
the public interest if the Commission does not have jurisdiction 
on an ongoing basis, or that the sale will not be in the public 
interest if conditions that are a reasonable substitute for the 
exercise of jurisdiction cannot be imposed subsequent to the 
sale. Again, the Commissions rush to judgment has deprived 
itself, and ultimately this Court, of the record against which 
that determination can be judged. 
The manner in which the Commission conducted the pro-
ceedings below is equally troublesome. Although the Commission 
purported to make findings of fact, those findings of fact have 
nothing to do with the ultimate conclusions. Indeed, the Commis-
sion's Conclusions of Law are largely factual recitations couched 
in terms of surmise or speculation. This Court, and other courts 
reviewing administrative decisions, have consistently and repeat-
edly underscored the importance of due process to those appearing 
before an cidministrative body. The quintessential violation of 
due process in an administrative context occurs when, as in this 
case, findings of fact are made without any supporting evidence 
even being presented let alone considered and subsequently, con-
clusions of law are reached that have no relationship to the 
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unsupported findings. This is particularly true when the ulti-
mate conclusions characterize the parties before it in 
perjorative terms without any evidence to support these charac-
terizations. Quite simply, this matter must be remanded to the 
Commission for further proceedings consistent with the constitu-
tional mandate for due process and basic fairness. 
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SYNOPSIS 
Applicant, a certificated water corporation, seeks approval of 
the sale of all its stock to a local governmental entity and the 
assumption of service to its present customers by a municipal 
corporation. Applicant further asks the Commission to declare it has 
no jurisdiction over the municipality's subsequent water service 
operations insofar as they relate to Applicant's customers residing 
outside the municipal boundaries. We deem the jurisdictional 
question of such importance that it should be resolved before 
inquiring whether the transfer is in the public interest. 
Accordingly, we sever the prayer for declaratory relief from the 
balance of the proceeding and declare the Commission has jurisdiction 
over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service 
outside its boundaries as a general business. 
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y the Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The application in this matter was filed November 4, 1991. The 
:ommission conducted a prehearing conference December 9, 1991, and 
isked the parties to brief the issues of the Commission's 
jurisdiction to approve the contract which is the subject of these 
proceedings and, should the contract be approved, the Commission's 
jurisdiction over Sandy City in connection with water customers 
residing outside the city. Oral arguments were heard by the 
Commission on February 18, 1992. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Commission enters the following Report and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Applicant is a water corporation certificated by this 
Commission. In its Application, Applicant seeks approval of a 
transfer of all its outstanding stock to an instrumentality of 
Sandy City Corporation, (hereafter "Sandy") a Utah municipal 
corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the 
form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system 
constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the 
State of Utah." 
2. Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would be 
transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City 
(hereafter "the Authority"). Applicant would retain its 
corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds issued by the 
Authority to finance the purchase. 
3. Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a nominal 
rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn 
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would sublease to Sandy. Sandy would actually operate the 
system and, to the extent feasible, would integrate Applicant's 
present system with Sandy's municipal system- Payment to the 
bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals 
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to 
pay the rental fees out of water charges to customers. 
4. In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers residing 
outside the city limits will be charged more than those 
residing within. The stated rationale is that the customers 
outside the city limits should bear a greater proportion of the 
costs of the acquisition. 
5. In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically conditioned 
upon this Commission's final Order declaring that the 
Commission does not have and will not assert any jurisdiction 
over Sandy, whether in regard to customers residing inside or 
outside the city limits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As we view it, Applicant seeks two separate and distinct forms 
of relief—approval, per se, of the contract, and declaratory relief 
in regard to the Commission's jurisdiction. We deem the declaratory 
branch of the proceeding so important that it should be severed from 
the approval branch. 
The subject transaction differs from other transfers hitherto 
considered, by the Commission in that the transfer is to an entity 
arguably outside Commission jurisdiction. It would leave a number of 
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances, 
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. Given 
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lat stark fact, we refuse to take the "all or nothing" choice 
resented by Applicant, Instead, we propose to resolve the 
arisdictional issue in this proceeding, with the docket number in 
he caption above, as a matter separate from the contract approval* 
n light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to 
roceed or not in the approval action. 
We turn now to the merits of the jurisdictional issue. 
We concede at the outset that we have no authority to regulate 
L municipality within its boundaries. However, we conclude that case 
.aw, statutory law, and public policy support our authority to 
regulate Sandyfs water service outside its boundaries. In reaching 
:his conclusion, we believe the salient considerations include 
aisenfranchisement of the extra-territorial customers, Sandy's 
limited statutory powers, the structure of the transaction, our 
doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute 
exercise of a municipal function, and our skepticism that Sandy would 
indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes. 
Dis€?nfranchisement of the Customers 
At present, all of Applicant's customers, inside and outside 
the city limits, have recourse to the Commission to ensure just and 
reasonable rates. Absent our involvement in Sandy's ratemaking 
outside its boundaries, the customers would have no means to prevent 
Sandy from charging excessive rates. In its initial brief, Sandy 
states that the customers are not "entirely" disenfranchised, since 
they can attend Sandy City public meetings. (Sandy, Initial Brief, at 
9). 
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We deem the assertion less than ingenuous. One cannot be 
partially disenfranchised; either one can vote or not. Clearly the 
customers located outside Sandy's boundaries do not have a right to 
vote in Sandy City. The opportunity to attend meetings is a poor 
substitute for the right to reward or punish via the ballot. 
The fact that Sandy proposes to charge a differential rate 
immediately upon approval of the transaction is a strong indication 
of how the "outside" customers would fare under the proposal. 
Indeed, we can predict with considerable confidence, that in case of 
conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised 
customers, the interests of the former will receive priority—no 
matter how vociferous the protests raised in meetings. 
Limitation of Sandy's Statutory Powers 
Unquestionably, as Sandy asserts, the Commission is a creature 
of statute with all the limitations on power and jurisdiction that 
implies. However, Sandy itself stands in much the same position; its 
powers are circumscribed also. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d 
1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).1 
We proceed first on the premise that if Sandy takes over the 
utility service of White City Water Company, the city must also take 
on the utility's obligations. According to our Supreme Court in 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co, 223 P. 2d 577 
1The yHutchinson Court actually broadened a municipality's 
authority by holding that the powers delegated by the Legislature 
should be liberally construed. The Court's rationale was that local 
democratic institutions should be strengthened, thus empowering 
citizens in regard to the local affairs most immediately affecting 
them. Were we to adopt the Applicant's position, we would, of 
course, actually disempower the extra-territorial customers, running 
counter to the Hutchinson rationale. 
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Utah 1950), when North Salt Lake condemned a water company, it took 
pon itself the obligations imposed upon the water company, including 
he effect of an Order issued by this Commission before the 
:ondemnat ion.2 
Other jurisdictions have extended the principle explicitly to 
Include rate regulation. For example, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss, 
204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), the court held that the South Carolina 
PSC had jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical 
facilities outside its boundaries. The court held that the 
constitutional grant of Power to municipalities by the State to 
operate electrical facilities was not a limitation on the power of 
the State to regulate those activities through the PSC or otherwise. 
It is the position of the plaintiff in the current action 
that this constitutional grant of power to the 
municipalities of the State to operate electrical 
facilities is a limitation on the power of the State of 
South Carolina to regulate those activities through the 
Public Service Commission or otherwise. The writer does 
not agree. He feels that the section in question was no 
more than a constitutional provision to permit certain 
municipal activities previously held ultra vires and that 
2At the time of that hearing the water company was a 
utility subject to the rules and regulations of the 
Public Service Commission and its findings and orders 
were binding on the company, its successors, those 
claiming through or under it, and those later dealing 
with it. 
* * * 
If limitations were imposed on the water company in the 
hearing before the Public Service Commission, then 
condemnation of the property by the town would not unblock 
the * controls. The . . . town takes the franchise and 
property subject to all burdens of furnishing water that 
were imposed at the time of transfer. 
Id. at 223 P.2d 577. If a previous Commission Order is binding on a 
town clearly exercising a municipal function, a fortiori the town is 
subject to Commission regulation when exercising a non-municipal 
function. 
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it is not to be construed as limiting the powers of the 
State to regulate such activities, (emphasis added.) 
Id. at 378. It is true that South Carolina had in place legislation 
specifically empowering their PSC to regulate extra-territorial 
service. The issue, nevertheless, was the constitutionality of that 
legislation, and we believe there is scant difference in principle 
between that case and this. 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the obligations 
Sandy may be required to assume is that of state regulation of rates 
charged to customers residing outside the city limits. 
As derogating from the foregoing analysis, we have been cited 
Article XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which provides a 
municipality the authority to furnish public utility services "local 
in extent and use"; Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914 (3) ; the Municipal 
Building Authority Act; the 1988 amended definition of "person" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 4-2-2; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 which gives a 
municipality authority to condemn a water system. We do not 
perceive any of these provisions as denying us authority to regulate 
rates charged by Sandy for water service outside its boundaries. 
Article XI, Section 5, gives Sandy the power to furnish public 
utility services, but not necessarily the power to set extra-
territorial rates, particularly in light of the "local in extent and 
use" provision, which has no obvious meaning other than as a 
reference to the City's boundaries. 
Any prohibition by the Municipal Building Authority Act is 
irrelevant in this proceeding. As noted in the Findings of Fact 
above, the sole role of the Authority is to be a conduit. 
Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its own bonds. We strongly 
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uspect the Authority is involved in the transaction only in a "belt 
nd suspenders" attempt to insulate the real principals, Applicant 
nd Sandy, from our jurisdiction. We believe we are entitled to 
ssess the substance, not the mere form, of the transaction. So 
issessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real 
role or participation in the arrangement, and its presence should be 
lisregarded. 
It is true that in 1988 the Legislature deleted "governmental 
entity" from the definition of "person." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2 
(1988). Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change, 
however, does not indicate that the Legislature intended to foreclose 
our regulation of a city's extra-territorial retail water customers. 
(See transcript of the Legislative history on this amendment, 
Exhibit "A" to Reply Brief, White City Water Users). 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 does give a municipality power 
to condemn a water system, but it does not necessarily give a 
municipality power to set utility rates for extra-territorial retail 
customers. In a condemnation proceeding, a city is limited by strict 
laws to protect the new owners of those systems and the citizens 
served thereby. Indeed, as noted earlier, the St. Joseph Water case, 
supra, suggests that water systems acquired by condemnation carry 
with them all their regulatory baggage. 
Sandy does not have specific delegated authority to serve water 
outside its boundaries without state regulation. Where there are 
gaps in the coverage of applicable statutes, as in the instant case, 
we believe that legislative intent should be interpreted so as to 
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protect constitutional rights of citizens, which in this case are the 
extra-territorial retail customers. 
The Nature of the Arrangement 
As noted above, Sandy has made great efforts to avoid our 
jurisdiction in the way it has set up the proposed transfer. The 
elaborate nature of the arrangement between White City, the 
Authority, and Sandy, renders the arrangement suspect. 
Sandy's initial brief claims that neither White City, the 
Authority, nor Sandy are subject to our regulation. (Sandy, Initial 
Brief, at 6-14) . As noted above, the role of the Authority is 
explicable only as an attempt to avoid our jurisdiction. Given the 
expressed intent to charge extra-territorial customers differential 
rates, Sandy's good faith, in structuring the transaction as it has, 
must be questioned. 
Sandy is Not Performing a Municipal Function 
Should Sandy provide water service to White City's extra-
territorial customers, it would, to that extent, not be exercising a 
municipal function. Sandy would be acting as a traditional utility 
(exercising a business function) and therefore would be subject to 
regulation. 
Sandy claims that Utah Constitution Art. VI, Section 28, 
prohibits us from interfering with Sandy's municipal functions. 
(Sandy, Initial Brief, at 7). Obviously, we agree that we cannot 
interfere s,with Sandy's municipal functions, but we maintain that 
Sandy's proposed service to the extra-territorial customers is not a 
municipal function. 
DOCKET NO. 91-018-02 
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Recent Utah cases support our position. In Utah Associated 
lunicipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, 789 P. 2d 298 
[Utah 1990), in which Art. VI, Section 28, was at issue, the Court 
liscussed the alleged "municipal function" performed by Utah 
Associated Municipal Power Systems ("UAMPS") in attempting to 
construct a utility line and to provide utility service. UAMPS 
resisted the jurisdiction of the Commission on constitutional 
grounds, arguing that they were political subdivisions exercising 
municipal functions, even though part of their service area was 
located outside, or would have a substantial impact outside, the 
boundaries of the political subdivisions. 
The UAMPS Court applied a balancing test first enunciated in 
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d, 530 
(Utah 1988). Under that test, no particular activity conducted by a 
municipality is ipso facto a municipal function for purposes of Art. 
VI, Section 28. Instead, a functional analysis is to be conducted, 
considering such factors as 
the relative abilities of the state and municipal 
governments to perform the function, the degree to which 
the performance of the function affects the interests of 
those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the 
extent to which the legislation under attack will intrude 
upon the ability of the people within the municipality to 
control through their elected officials the substantive 
policies that affect them uniquely.3 
3Id. kat 534. The Court went on to say the balancing test would 
best serve the Constitutional purpose without "erecting mechanical 
conceptual categories that, without serving any substantial interest, 
may hobble the effective government which the state constitution as 
a whole was designed to permit." Ibid. In the instant case, of 
course, the only "substantial interest" our assuming jurisdiction 
would affect would %be that of Sandy in "milking" the extra-
territorial customers to the maximum extent possible. 
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Applying that test, the UAMPS Court had little difficulty in finding 
that the construction of the utility transmission line for the 
purpose of generating, buying and selling electricity across the 
state was outside the ambit of Art. VI, Section 28. Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, supra, 789 P. 
2d at 302. 
The present proposal is closely analogous to the UAMPS case. 
In particular, those residing outside Sandy stand to be severely 
impacted, while our assuming jurisdiction in regard to them would 
have minimal impact on Sandy's legitimate interests. By purposefully 
acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking over the 
obligation to serve 58% of the customers of an existing certificated 
public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the exercise of its 
municipal function and subjecting itself to state regulation of rates 
for those extra-territorial customers surplus. 
Sandy attempts to bolster its position by referring to Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-14(1) concerning sale of surplus water by a 
municipality. A careful reading of this statute, however, weighs 
against Sandy's proposal and in favor of the extra-territorial 
customers. 
According to the statute, a city "may sell and deliver the 
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not required 
by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the 
city. . .s . " in attempting to show that it would be serving 
"surplus" water in accordance with this statute, Sandy states that it 
"has more than ample capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City 
customers and will therefore in fact be selling 'surplus1 water to 
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hem upon acquisition of the White City system." (Sandy, Initial 
irief, at 8). This interpretation is contrary to Utah case law on 
:he subject and contrary to a common sense definition of "surplus." 
In support of Sandy's interpretation of surplus, it cites 
:ountv Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P 2d 285 (Utah 1954) and 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P 2d 119 (Utah 1977) 
In County Water System, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the authority of municipalities to sell utility services beyond 
its corporate boundaries was limited to the disposal of surplus 
water. Id. at 289. 
In fact, after first delineating a municipality's powers of 
surplus water disposal in sweeping terms, Justice Crockett, writing 
for the Court, appears to have had immedicite second thoughts. In his 
next paragraph, he hedged the municipality's authority: 
But such permissive sale of surplus water . . . is clearly 
not calculated to permit the city to purchase water solely 
for resale, nor to construct, own or manage facilities and 
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its 
city limits as a general business. 
Id. at 290. 
The Court also made clear its concept of surplus water—a 
temporary glut occasioned by provision for prudent future expansion. 
This would, according to the court, foreclose a municipality's 
commitment to purchasers of surplus water for any long-term supply. 
Ibid. Under this concept, if Sandy is indeed to sell surplus water, 
the extra-territorial customers stand to be left literally high and 
dry in the near to medium term. 
In this case, however, Sandy will not be disposing of surplus 
water it now possesses—it will be surplus only by virtue of Sandy's 
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calculated acquisition of a class of captive, disenfranchised 
customers—precisely the situation Justice Crockett inveighed 
against. 
Sandy cites Salt Lake County, supra, for the proposition that 
11
 [A municipality's] business in furnishing water to its residents and 
activities reasonably incidental thereto is not subject to 
regulation by the Public Service Commission." Id. at 570 P.2d 121-
122. Sandy, however, fails to quote the complete paragraph. The 
next, and more relevant sentence is: "But just however great an 
extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its 
city limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so 
clearly determined." (emphasis added.) The second sentence is not 
mere dictum. The case involved the propriety of a summary judgment 
rendered by the district court, and the Supreme Court remanded for 
determination of precisely the issue of a municipality's amenability 
to regulation of extra-territorial service. We do not know the 
subsequent course of the litigation. 
The Salt Lake County case evidences to us the Court's concern 
with precisely the potential for abuse presented by the instant 
proposal. We think it would be difficult to find a clearer instance 
of a city's stepping over the boundary of legitimate surplus water 
sales under the statute. 
Our conclusion is strengthened by C.P. National Corporation v. 
Public Service Commission, 638 P. 2d 519 (Utah 1981), According to 
the Court, 
" . . . We believe that [Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14] imposes 
a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It 
negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage 
in the distribution of power to localities or persons 
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outside its limits except to dispose of surplus." [Citing 
County Water System, supra]. In the instant case, the 
municipalities intend to continue to serve a large area 
outside any of their limits. . . . 
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city 
to so operate its electric light and power works. There 
is good justification for this limitation since 
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the 
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service 
Commission but are controlled solely by the 
administration of the city or town wherein they are 
located . . . customers who are non-residents of the 
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials 
over whom they have no control at the ballot box and they 
could not turn to the Public Service Commission for 
relief. (emphasis added.) (citations omitted.) 
Id. at 524. 
We can only add that the situation is not one whit different 
when a municipality purposefully acquires an existing, regulated 
water system. While there may be no explicit statutory authority for 
us to assume jurisdiction, the obvious remedy for the abuse of extra-
territorial customers is for us to continue to regulate their rates; 
otherwise, to meet the Court's concern, the instant proposal would 
have to be found ultra vires.4 
If there is a common thread running through the history of 
economic regulation in the United States, it is the abhorrence of 
unchecked monopoly. We see no reason to suppose that a monopoly held 
by a municipality over powerless extra-territorial utility customers 
would be any more benevolent than a monopoly held privately. Sandy's 
expressed intent to impose higher rates immediately upon the extra-
AThat is the course the Court took in the CP National case. The 
main issue was the constitutionality of the municipalities' acquiring 
an existing electrical utility by condemnation. The Court assumed 
without discussion that we would have no jurisdiction over rates 
charged the extra-territorial customers. One wonders if the same 
result would have been reached had the Court considered the 
jurisdictional issue and applied the City of West Jordan test. 
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territorial customers is ample demonstration of the reason we are 
unwilling to cede jurisdiction in these circumstances• 
We conclude that in the event the proposal presented by 
Applicant were to be approved by the Commission, the Commission would 
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the extra-territorial 
retail customers, at least to the extent of nullifying invidious 
discrimination. Accordingly, Applicants prayer for a declaratory 
judgment to the contrary should be denied. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
» On the Commission's own motion, the prayer of WHITE CITY WATER 
COMPANY, for a declaration that, should the Commission approve 
a transfer of the stock of said company to the Sandy City 
Building Board, pursuant to the contract delineated in said 
Company's application, the Commission would have no 
jurisdiction thereafter to set rates for customers residing 
outside the boundaries of Sandy City, be, and the same hereby 
is, severed from the balance of the proceeding and given the 
Docket Number 91-018-02; 
>> Said prayer is denied; 
>> Any party aggrieved by this Order may, within 30 days of the 
issuance hereof, petition for review; failure so to do will 
forfeit the right to such review, as well as the right to 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of February, 
.992. 
/s/ Brian T. Stewart, Chairman 
(SEAL) /s/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
/s/ Stephen C. Hewlett, Commissioner 
Pro Tempore 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
Tab 2 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY FOR 
COMMISSION APPROVAL OF A CONTRACT 
ENTERED INTO ON THE 8TH DAY OF 
OCTOBER, 1991/ UNDER WHICH 
CONTRACT SANDY CITY AND THE 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY OF 
SANDY CITY/ UTAH, WILL PURCHASE 
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING STOCK OF 
WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY 
White City Water Company hereby petitions and 
represents to the Commission as follows: 
1. White City Wat^r Company is a corporation 
organized under and pursuant to the laws of the State of 
Utah and having its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County/ State of Utah. 
2. Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized 
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Utah and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
3. The Municipal Building Authority of Sandy 
City, Utah/ is established and created pursuant to Title 17A, 
Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
4. On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City 
and the Muncipal Building Authority of Sandy City entered 
APPLICATION 
Docket No . ty-OIS-O] 
into a contract with White City Water Company whereby Sandy 
City, through its municipal building authority, will acquire 
the stock of White City Water Company, pursuant to certain 
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, a copy of 
which contract is marked Exhibit A and attached hereto. 
5. White City Water Company holds Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955, 
authorizing the Company to: 
(a) Construct, maintain and operate a water system 
consisting of a water well located in Section 8, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian 
in Salt Lake County, Utah having a capacity of 
approximately 1,200 gallons of water per minute 
with a pipe line leading from said well to a 500,000 
gallon reservoir located in Section 9, Township 3 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
with a pipe line leading from said storage tank 
to the area to be served with the necessary distribution 
lines, service lines and other facilities to serve 
water for domestic, culinary and other purposes 
within the area bounded on the West by the East 
line of 7th East Street, on the East by 20th East 
Street, on the North by 94th South Street and 
on the South by 120th South Street in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
(b) To construct, maintain and operate such additional 
wells, pipe lines and extended water system facilities 
as may be necessary from time to time to adequately 
serve water for domestic, culinary and other purposes 
within the area above specified. 
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6. The above described geographical area is 
contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City and partly 
within the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County. White 
City Water Company has approximately 3650 customers plus 
83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected. 42% of 
the connections are within the city limits of Sandy City 
and 58% are in contiguous Salt Lake County. 
7. Sandy City has constructed and maintained 
a municipal culinary water system rendering service to approxi-
mately 21/050 residential/ commercial/ and industrial customers 
within the limits of Sandy City. The Sandy City water system 
is an efficient and well-maintained system having facilities 
to deliver water to its customers. The water system at present 
has facilities which are fully sufficient to provide storage 
and pressure to its existing customers as well as to the customers 
of White City Water Company if this contract is approved. 
8. White City Water Company has a distributing 
system sufficient to serve its current customers. White 
City Water Company also has water rights which during 
ordinary years are fully sufficient to give adequate and 
continuous water service to its customers. However, White 
City Water Company lacks adequate facilities for the 
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storage of water at a sufficient elevation to provide sufficient 
pressure to adequately serve its customers and, in case 
of an emergency draw down, a lack of sufficient storage 
capacity to meet a prolonged emergency. In order to adjust 
for this situation. White City Water Company has arrangements 
whereby it will sell certain water at its wellheads to the 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and purchase 
back at a very much higher price from the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District water delivered at a sufficient 
elevation and in sufficient quantities to provide both pressure 
and adequate flow in emergency situations. This arrangement 
is an expensive one for White City Water Company as it receives 
for its water at the wellhead under this contract $20.00 
per acre foot while it pays for the water delivered at the 
higher elevations the sum of $125.22 per acre foot. This 
contract with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
is subject to cancellation by the parties. Furthermore, 
the price to be charged for the water that is delivered 
is almost exclusively at the discretion of the Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District. Thus White City Water 
Company is under constant threat of either discontinuance 
of this service or the pricing of the service at a level 
-4-
which is unacceptable to White City Water Company and its 
customers who would bear the ultimate responsibility of 
paying for these services through higher rates. 
9. White City Water Company has attempted to 
get permission to construct additional storage facilities 
on property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of 
sufficient elevation to provide adequate pressure. Sandy 
City, however, has been unwilling to grant a variance from 
zoning ordinances to permit the construction of such storage 
facilities and this Commission has declined to use its authority, 
if such authority it has, to compel Sandy City to grant 
such variance. White City Water Company has explored other 
sites outside Sandy City as a possible location for constructing 
new storage facilities; however, all such available sites 
are expensive to purchase, remote from the White City Water 
Companyfs distribution system and its wells and would entail 
the expenditure of money beyond the present resources of 
White City Water Company. If it were possible to borrow 
funds for such construction, it would require substantially 
higher rates from the customers of White City Water Company 
in order to service the debt and amortize the investment 
of such additional storage facilities. 
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10. Sandy City already has in existence or under 
construction sufficient storage facilities to provide adequate 
volume and pressure for White City Water Ccmpany customers 
if operation of the two systems were integrated. 
11. While White City Water Company customers 
now pay generally lower rates than Sandy City charges to 
its customers for similar service/ this situation will not 
prevail for long if White City must continue to render the 
service to its customers on its own. The cost of maintaining 
an aging system and the cost of required new facilities 
as above described will in the near future require White 
City Water Company to raise its rates substantially for 
it to continue as a viable corporation. 
12. The water systems cf White City Water Company 
and Sandy City are well matched for integration. The approval 
of this application is in the public interest and will result 
in better service to all customers of White City Water Company 
and Sandy City in the foreseeable future. 
13. As part of the terms of the agreement, the 
White City Water Company wll remain intact as a corporation 
over the life of the bonds which the municipal building 
authority of Sandy City proposes to issue to raise capital 
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for the acquisition of the stock of White City Water Company. 
Sandy City, however, will operate the two systems on an 
integrated basis and requests an order from this Commission 
to the effect that such an integrated system will be considered 
a municipal system in its entirety under the laws of the 
State of Utah and thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 174A-13-914(3) from the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, applicant prays that this matter be 
set down for hearing and that upon such hearing the Commission 
approve the contract described above and find that the integrated 
system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 31st day of^tfctbber, 1991./^ 
Calvin L. Rampton * ^ 
Attorney for White City Water Company 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
) ss 
) 
John E. Papanikolas, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says that I am the President of White City Water 
Company, that I have read the foregoing Application and 
that the same is true and complete to the best of my knowledge 
and belief. 
— ^ 7 — ^ ' —— 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this :.^ "/ day 
of October, 1991. 
<^j 
s?S-
6' 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
Notary P u b l i c ^ ^ > ^ p ^*j<;/^ *>-<^- , ,-•' 
R e s i d i n g a t J ^ J z /<?T.^~si / ^ Cs-tt-rtdt / ^jS/S? 7 
/ / •?/ 
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